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Comments

Hidden Whois and Infringing Domain Names:
Making the Case for Registrar Liability
Ian J. Blockt

INTRODUCTION

When registering domain names for websites, registrants
must supply contact information that appears in the Whois database. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") maintains the Whois database as a means of
making information available about website owners (registrants), so that disputes concerning those sites can be resolved
quickly.' Increasingly, domain name registrars are offering registrants the option to purchase additional services, sold as "hidden Whois" 2 or "Whois privacy ' 3 services. When a registrant emt BA 2006, Georgetown University; JD Candidate 2009, University of Chicago.
1 ICANN Whois Services, <http://www.icann.orgtopics/whois-services/> (last visited
May 15, 2008).
2 Spot Domain LLC Products and Services, <http://www.domainsite.com/web_
enhancement/hidden_whois.php> (last visited May 15, 2007) (explaining Spot Domain's
Hidden Whois service). This explanation, however, is an inaccurate reflection of the information that actually appears as a result in a Whois directory search. Spot Domain
claims that "[o]ur Hidden Whois service will hide all registrar whois information for your
domain name except for your first, last, and company name"; however, none of the unhidden information appears in Whois directory search results. Accordingly, the actual identity of registrants using this service cannot be ascertained unless released by Spot Domain.
3 Domain Whois Privacy, <http://www.moniker.com/domains/domain-privacy.jsp>
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ploys this feature, the registrar's contact information appears in
the registration information section of the Whois report for the
domain name. As such, the true registrant is an undisclosed
principal whose actual information never appears in the Whois
database. 4 Hidden Whois services were devised initially to help
registrants deflect spam that was sent to addresses found in the
Whois database, 5 but it is believed that such services are increasingly used to shield registrants from litigation arising from their
websites. By only being able to find a registrar's information
when searching the Whois database, a prospective plaintiff is
unable to ascertain the identity of the contested site's registrant,
which effectively serves to undermine the purpose, value, and
efficacy of the Whois database.
This Comment proposes that courts interpret existing
trademark law to find registrar liability when registrars appear
as registrants in the Whois database for infringing domain
names. The Comment will proffer a legal theory for private
trademark enforcement by developing the position that such registrar liability can and should be found under present statutes.
Part I provides historical and technical background information about cybersquatting, as well as the evolution of legislative
and judicial efforts to enforce its prevention. This part of the
Comment reviews the context of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act's ("ACPA") 6 passage and subsequent application. The ACPA explicitly created a statutory tort barring cybersquatting. The liability rule proposed in Part II of this Comment would operate as a strong reading of the ACPA under its
existing framework and intent.
Part II sets out the argument for adopting the proposed liability rule by explaining its statutory justification under the
ACPA and applicability under prevailing agency principles. This
section details the effects of the proposed rule on ACPA remedies
and calls attention to the benefits and efficiencies created by
adopting the proposed liability rule. Part II also responds to potential criticisms that might be levied against the proposed rule.
(last visited May 15, 2008). This page is an example of a domain name registrar offering
Whois Privacy services for an additional fee above standard registration costs.
4 See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(2)(b) (2006) (defining a principal as undisclosed if, when an agent and a third party interact, the third party has no notice that
the agent is acting for a principal).
5 ICANN Whois Services, <http://www.icann.orgtopics/whois-services> (last visited
May 15, 2008) (cited in note 1).
6 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub L No 106-113, 113 Stat
1536, 1501A-545 (1999), codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (1999).
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Part III concludes that the history and evolution of internet
domain name usage, together with Congress' legislative pronouncement against cybersquatting, highlights the need for this
Comment's proposed liability rule to prevent cybersquatting.
Hidden Whois services promote evasion from private trademark
law enforcement, so adopting the liability rule against domain
name registrars offering such services will aid in enforcement
efforts and cybersquatting prevention.
I. BACKGROUND
The routers that shuffle packets of information across the
internet respond to numeric IP addresses that denote the location of internet sites. 7 These addresses take the form of four
numbers that are delimited by periods, such as 121.7.106.83.8
Because humans appreciate alphanumeric mnemonic devices
over complicated numerical sequences, IP addresses are set to
correspond to more accessible domain names. 9 Therefore, domain
names identify websites on the internet for the purposes of user
navigation. 10 Users are able to type domain names into internet
browsers to access websites on the internet. These domain
names, then, are the signifiers that users recognize as the effective addresses of their internet destinations." Companies use
trade names, nicknames, abbreviations, or other names recognizable to consumers as internet domain names, since these familiar terms are easily recalled and used by consumers.12 Users'
internet searches often begin with a business's domain name,
making the domain name one of the most important business
identifiers today. 13
7 James F. Kurose and Keith W. Ross, Computer Networking at 123 (Addison Wesley
3d ed 2005).
8 Id.

9 Id ("An IP address looks like 121.7.106.83, where each period separates one of the
bytes expressed in decimal notation from 0 to 255. An IP address is hierarchical because
as we scan the address from left to right, we obtain more and more specific information
about where the host is located in the [i]nternet (that is, within which network, in the
network of networks). Similarly, when we scan a postal address from top to bottom, we
obtain more and more specific information about where the addressee is located."). The
Domain Name System ("DNS') converts alphanumeric domain name inputs into machine
recognizable IP addresses.
10 Steven R. Borgman, The New Federal Cybersquatting Laws, 8 Tex Intel Prop L J
265, 266 (2000).
11 Kurose, Computer Networking at 123 (cited in note 7).
12 J. Theodore Smith, Note, "1-800-RIPOFFS.COM":Internet Domain Names are the
Telephone Numbers of Cyberspace, 1997 U Ill L Rev 1169, 1169-70 (1997).
13 Gregory R. Jones, What's in a Name? Trademark Infringement in Cyberspace, 68
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Domain name registration is overseen by ICANN. Registrants are the parties that come to own individual domain names
for use. They pay registrars to register desired and available domain names. Registrars supply ICANN with information, which
leads to the activation of the registered domain name. Domain
names are distributed on a first come, first served basis; therefore, once a registrant registers a specific domain name it becomes unavailable for registration by others. In their standard
capacities, registrars help potential registrants identify available
domain names and then register those names with ICANN so
that they can be used by registrants.
Aided by an inexpensive registration process and incentivized by the possibility of reaping windfalls from trademark holders, cybersquatting is a significant problem for domain name registration and protecting trademark rights online. 14 In general,
cybersquatting is the practice of registering or using a domain
name in which others have legitimate interests and then attempting to sell that name either to the trademark owner or to
the highest bidder. 15 As the internet has grown in prominence as
a medium for commerce and communications, so too has the
prevalence of cybersquatting.16 Various forms of cybersquatting
include: 1) registering another's mark as a domain name; 2) registering a misspelling of another's mark as a domain name,
commonly referred to as "typosquatting"; 3) registering another's
mark as a domain name in top level domains other than .com (for
instance, .biz, .cc, .fr, or .tv); 4) registering another's mark as
part of a domain name; and 5) registering another individual's
name as a domain. 17
Trademark infringement by cybersquatting presents a fundamental economic and analytical difference from standard
trademark infringement. Trademarks in the real world, such as
logos, brand names, and other marks, are public goods insofar as
infringing use does not prevent the trademark owner from using
his mark; however, domain names are private goods because

Ala Law 70, 71 (2007).
14 World Intellectual Property Organization, Cybersquatting Remains on the Rise
with further Risk to Trademarks from New Registration Practices,PR/2007/479 (Mar 12,
2007), available at <http:lwww.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article_0014.html>
(last visited May 15, 2008).
15 The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S Rep No 106-140, 106th Cong,
1st Sess 4-5 (1999) (Senate Report discussing the definition of cybersquatting).
16 Borgman, 8 Tex Intel Prop L J at 266 (cited in note 10).
17 Id.

431]

HIDDEN WHOIS AND INFRINGING DOMAIN NAMES

435

there can only be one owner of any given unique domain name.
For example, whereas any number of firms could physically sell
goods under the Acme brand name simultaneously, there can be
only one owner and user of the domain name www.acme.com.
That domain names are excludable compounds the harms created by cybersquatters.
Cybersquatting creates numerous harms. As the Senate
found in its Report on the ACPA, "[t]he practice of cybersquatting harms consumers, electronic commerce, and the goodwill
equity of valuable U.S. brand names, upon which consumers increasingly rely to locate the true source of genuine goods and
services on the Internet."' 8
Prior to the 1999 enactment of the ACPA, which explicitly
barred cybersquatting, victims sought to enforce their rights in
cyberspace under traditional trademark law. In Panavision International v Toeppen, 19 plaintiff Panavision owned trademarks
for the term Panavision, but was unable to register the internet
domain name Panavision.com because defendant Dennis Toeppen previously registered and owned the domain name. 20 Panavision's counsel sent a letter to Toeppen pointing out Panavision's
ownership of marks and demanding that Toeppen cease to use
the mark as a domain name. Toeppen refused, instead offering to
21
sell the domain name to Panavision to "settle the matter."
When Panavision refused to buy the domain name, Toeppen registered the domain name PanaFlex.com, which corresponded to
another of Panavision's trademarks. 22 In the absence of federal
law explicitly barring cybersquatting at that time, Panavision
sued under anti-dilution provisions of state and federal trademark laws. 23 Panavision won summary judgment in the district
24
court.
18 S Rep No 106-140 at 5 (cited in note 15).

19 141 F3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998).
Id at 1318-20.
21 Id at 1319. As recounted by the Court: "Toeppen responded by mail to Panavision
in California, stating he had the right to use the name Panavision.com on the Internet as
his domain name. Toeppen stated: 'If your attorney has advised you otherwise, he is trying to screw you. He wants to blaze new trails in the legal frontier at your expense. Why
do you want to fund your attorney's purchase of a new boat (or whatever) when you can
facilitate the acquisition of 'PanaVision.com' cheaply and simply instead?"'
22 Id.
23 Panavision, 141 F3d at 1319 ("Panavision alleged claims for dilution of its trademark under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), and under
the California Anti-dilution statute, California Business and Professions Code § 14330.").
24 PanavisionInternational,L.P. v Toeppen, 945 F Supp 1296, 1306 (C D Cal 1996).
20
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On Toeppen's appeal, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the case
under a dilution rubric. 25 At that time, dilution required that: 1)
the mark was famous; 2) the defendant was making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; 3) the defendant's use began
after the mark became famous; and 4) the defendant's use of the
mark diluted the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity
of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services. 26
Toeppen challenged the district court's finding that his use of the
Panavision mark as his domain name was a commercial use, arguing that merely using a trademark as a domain could not constitute commercial use under existing law.27 The court recognized that case law supported Toeppen's argument that the mere
registration and use of a domain name was not commercial use, 28
but the court went on to conclude that Toeppen's use was a commercial use because his cybersquatting and attempts to sell the
trademarked domain names to their rightful owners were commercial uses. 29 Apparently swayed heavily by Toeppen's strong
commercial use of Panavision's marks, 30 the court held that
Toeppen's use diluted Panavision's marks. The court noted that
the cybersquatting increased search and information costs upon
plaintiff's customers by requiring them to search for the plaintiff
with then cumbersome search engines (as opposed to just typing
31
in the domain name).
In reaching its finding of dilution, however, the court recognized that neither it nor the district court relied on the traditional dilution forms of "blurring" or "tarnishment. '' 32 Blurring
occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiff's trademark to identify
the defendant's goods or services, creating the possibility that the
25 Panavision,141 F3d at 1324.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

29 Panavision, 141 F3d at 1325-26 ('CToeppen's commercial use was his attempt to
sell the trademarks themselves. Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the
California Anti-dilution statute, this was sufficient commercial use.").
30 Id at 1325 ("Toeppen's 'business' is to register trademarks as domain names and
then sell them to the rightful trademark owners. He acts as a 'spoiler,' preventing Panavision and others from doing business on the Internet under their trademarked names
unless they pay his fee.") (quotations omitted).
31 Id at 1327.

32 Id at 1326-27 ('To find dilution, a court need not rely on the traditional definitions
such as 'blurring' and 'tarnishment.' Indeed, in concluding that Toeppen's use of Panavision's trademarks diluted the marks, the district court noted that Toeppen's conduct
varied from the two standard dilution theories of blurring and tarnishment. The court
found that Toeppen's conduct diminished 'the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on the Internet."').
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mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the
plaintiff's product. 33 Tarnishment occurs when a famous mark is
improperly associated with an inferior or offensive product or
service. 34 As explained above, cybersquatting creates a different
harm from blurring or tarnishment by diminishing mark holders'
abilities to identify and distinguish their goods and services on
35
the internet.
In applying anti-dilution laws thusly to prevent cybersquatting, courts were forced to map dilution analysis onto harms that
were distinct from standard dilution harms. Toeppen's actions
formed an easy case for the court to find dilution. The egregious
facts satisfied dilution's commercial use requirements; Toeppen's
serial registration of over one hundred famous marks as domain
names and his repeated attempts to sell those domain names to
the mark owners clearly showed a commercial business model
premised on free riding others' trademark rights. 36 However, the
Panavisioncourt provided little, if any, guidance for prospective
efforts to prevent closer cases of less brazen cybersquatting.
For instance, even though the harm created by typosquatting is ostensibly the same as that created by Toeppen's brand of
cybersquatting, the court may have inadvertently condoned typosquatting. In distinguishing a case relied upon by Toeppen, in
which trademark infringement was not found against a defendant who obtained the most frequently misdialed phone number
of plaintiff's "vanity number" in an attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion, the Panavisioncourt noted that the slight misspelling did not constitute "use" of the plaintiff's mark. 37 While
33 Panavision, 141 F3d at 1326 n 7. Following 2006 amendments to the dilution provisions of the Lanham Act, "dilution by blurring' is statutorily defined as "is association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark." 15 USC § 1125(c)(2)(B).
34 Id. Following 2006 amendments to the dilution provisions of the Lanham Act,
"dilution by tarnishment" is statutorily defined as "association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark." 15 USC § 1125(c)(2)(C).
35 Panavision, 945 F Supp at 1304 (finding that defendant's cybersquatting diminished "the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's
goods and services on the Internet").
36 Panavision, 141 F3d at 1319 ('CToeppen has registered domain names for various
other companies including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and
over 100 other marks. Toeppen has attempted to 'sell' domain names for other trademarks such as intermatic.com to Intermatic, Inc. for $10,000 and americanstandard.com
to American Standard, Inc. for $15,000.').
37 Id at 1325. Toeppen relied on Holiday Inns, Inc v 800 Reservation, Inc, 86 F3d 619
(6th Cir 1996). The Panavisioncourt explained: "Holiday Inns is distinguishable. There,
the defendant did not use Holiday Inns' trademark. Rather, the defendant selected the
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the Panavisioncourt recognized that a domain name is generally
different from a numerical phone number, it considered vanity
phone numbers and domain names to be similar in that both use
words to identify source. 38 Accordingly, under Panavision'simprecise treatment of domain names, typosquatting might not
have constituted trademark use of a plaintiff's mark, as typosquatting involves slight misspellings of such marks. Even
though consumers can be confused by slight misspellings of domain names, foreclosing typosquatting from trademark use possibly excepted a large subset of likely confusing domain name
registrations from enforcement. This incomplete and uncertain
application of trademark law to infringing domain name registrations was unstable because it did not effectively map the
needs of trademark holders onto the nuances and difficulties of
the internet.
Toeppen shows that dilution analysis was the wrong vehicle
for addressing typosquatting. Initially conceived, dilution protection was supposed to be available as a source of added protection
beyond standard trademark infringement to a small number of
highly famous marks. There was no federal anti-dilution statute
prior to 1996, during which time trademark owners fought dilution with an uneven patchwork of state laws. The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA"), 39 enacted January 16,
1996, created a federal cause of action for dilution. At least one
prominent trademark commentator considered dilution protection under the FTDA too expansive. Thomas McCarthy wrote
that, "Under the 1996 Federal Act, too many courts did not take
the 'fame' requirement seriously and elevated to the 'famous'
category marks that surely did not belong there," adding that
dilution became an overused cause of action. 40 Dilution protection was not reined in until the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006,41 so anti-cybersquatting enforcement was left to inconsistent judicial treatment under a dilution rubric that was
stretched from its conceptual underpinnings through the middle

most commonly misdialed telephone number for Holiday Inns and attempted to capitalize
on consumer confusion." Id.
38 Panavision, 141 F3d at 1319.
39 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-98, 109 Stat 985 (1996),
codified at 15 USC § 1051 et seq.
40 J.Thomas McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 24:104
at 24:281 (4th ed 2007).
41 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-312, 120 Stat 1730, codified at 15 USC § 1051 et seq.
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and late 1990s. Relief arrived in 1999 with the enactment of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.
A.

ACPA Statute

Perceiving a rise in cybersquatting and amidst the uncertain
judicial backdrop described above, Congress passed the Anticy-

bersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") in

1999.42

The

ACPA created a statutory tort for cybersquatting, setting out the
43
standard that anyone who, with "bad faith intent to profit,"
"registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name" 44 that is a recognized trademark at the date of registration, 45 is liable of cybersquatting.46
By explicitly barring cybersquatting, the ACPA obviated
convoluted reliance on dilution theories to enforce protection
from cybersquatting and made private anti-cybersquatting enforcement much easier. 47 Rather than collapsing dilution analysis into a determination of commercial use, the revised § 43(d)
offers a non-exhaustive list of nine factors that courts may use to
determine bad faith intent to profit. 48 The factors allow courts to
42
1536,
43
44
45

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub L No 106-113, 113 Stat
1501A-545, codified at 15 USC § 1125(d) (2000).
15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(III).

46 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(A).
47 See generally Panavision, 141 F3d at 1316; Intermatic Inc v Toeppen, 947 F Supp
1227 (N D 1111996).
48 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). The nine non-exclusive factors for determining a person's bad faith intent to profit are: 1) the trademark or other intellectual property rights
of the person, if any, in the domain name; 2) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; 3) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or services; 4) the person's bona fide noncommercial or
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; 5) the person's intent to
divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a site accessible under the
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site; 6) the
person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or
any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the
domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 7) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain name,
the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's
prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 8) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of
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consider aspects mitigating bad faith intent to profit, such as a
cybersquatting defendant's noncommercial or fair use, prior use
of the contested name in selling goods or service, and any other
49
intellectual property rights to use the contested domain name.
Factors that tend towards findings of bad faith intent to profit
include a defendant's: intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name; offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain
without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain
name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; provision of material and misleading false contact information when
applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
and registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which
the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others. 50 Additionally, the ACPA allows cybersquatting enforcement for any distinctive mark, which relaxed the higher famousness requirement necessary for enforcement under dilution.
In registering websites with ICANN, registrars report the
contact information of their domain name registrants by submitting the information into the Whois database. The database
serves as an efficient means of ensuring transparency and accountability online by making website operators immediately
accessible in the real world. The case law prior to the ACPA held
that the then sole registrar, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"),
could not be liable for registering domain names to alleged cybersquatters. 51 The ACPA granted domain name registrars safe
harbor from liability for registering an infringing domain name
and for refusing to register, canceling, or transferring a domain
name in furtherance of a dispute resolution policy. 52 However,
this statutory safe harbor does not explicitly protect other ser-

such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and 9) the
extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name registration is or is
not distinctive and famous.
49 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV).

60 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V)-(VI11).
51 J.

Thomas McCarthy,

§ 25:73.40 (4th ed 2007).
52 15 USC § 1125(d).

4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
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vices, such as hidden Whois. 53 Hidden Whois services offered
legitimate benefits to early domain name registrants, by diverting massive amounts of computer generated spam email and
phishing attacks directed at Whois database registrants to registrars' shell email addresses. 54 Today, though, advances in spam
filtering technologies have mooted this justification for hidden
Whois services' continued existence. 55 It is suspected that the
foremost remaining purpose served by hidden Whois services is
to obscure the identities of domain name registrants. While some
percentage of registrants surely wish to avoid disclosing their
identities in the public Whois database purely for privacy reasons, scores of registrants operating infringing domain names
hide their identities to evade prosecution.
II. ESTABLISHING THE CASE FOR REGISTRAR LIABILITY
In light of the present state of domain name registration discussed above, this Part establishes the basis for domain name
registrar liability for registrants' illegal websites when hidden
Whois services are employed. This argument explains both the
legal justifications and policy rationales that support the proposed liability rule.
The problem to be solved is this: opportunistic domain name
registrars offer additional services to registrants that effectively
hide the identity and contact information of their domain name
registrant customers. The effect of these hidden Whois services is
to stifle accountability when registrants operate illegal websites
or own infringing domain names. Under the current arrangement, in which vacuous and inaccurate registrar information
appears in the Whois database in registrants' stead, aggrieved
plaintiffs must expend resources drafting demand letters to or
complaints against registrars to secure the true identities of defendant registrants. Hidden Whois services create unnecessary
barriers to enforcing registrant liability and accountability, thus
raising plaintiffs' costs of private enforcement while simultaneously creating revenues for domain name registrars. Plaintiffs
could rely upon agency principles to hold registrars liable for registrants' infringing websites under existing trademark laws.
53 Id.
54 ICANN Whois Services, <http://www.icann.org/topics/whois-services/> (last visited
May 15, 2008) (cited in note 1).
55 NSI's Hidden Whois accommodates both ends, by preventing spare and allowing
for registrant accountability.
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The proposed liability rule would serve as a middle ground
between the current regime of tacit tolerance of hidden Whois
services on one side and an outright ban of all hidden Whois services on the other: it would allow injured plaintiffs to efficiently
pursue the actual domain name owner or, if different, the party
that appears as registrant in the Whois database. This would
provide tort victims with clear access to remedies, and any resulting damages could be shifted between registrar and registrant by contract thereafter. ICANN and the Whois database set
public disclosure of registrant identity as the default. Those registrants interested in keeping their identities private when registering domain names would not be barred from doing so, but
would instead have to pay a presumptively higher registration
fee to buck the default rule by asking registrars to assume the
risk of their liability. In these ways, as explained below, the proposed rule accommodates the interests of registrars, registrants,
and trademark owners.
A.

Legal Basis for the Availability of Registrar Liability under
Existing Law

The legal argument for allowing liability to fall to registrars
operates within the space of the Lanham Act's anticybersquatting provisions. 56 This section of the Act outlaws the
registration, traffic in, and use of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to another's trademark, when such actions are made with bad faith intent to profit. 5 7 This prohibition
encompasses both cybersquatting, which is the registration of a
domain that is identical to another's trademark, and typosquatting, which is the registration of a domain name that is confusingly similar to another's trademark.58 The Act provides that
domain name registrars operating in their standard capacities as
registrars are essentially free from liability for the registration
and maintenance of registrants' illegal websites. 59 However, by
applying agency principles to the registrar/registrant relationship, the Lanham Act's anti-cybersquatting provisions could be
interpreted to find liability in registrars who offer hidden Whois
services for illegal websites. The way to achieve such a result
56 15 USC § 1125(d).
57 Id.
58 15 § 1125(d) prohibits the use of both identical and confusingly similar domain

names.
59 15 USC § 1114(2)(D)(iii).
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would be to expose to liability as registrant both true owners of
infringing domain names as well as any party appearing as registrant in the Whois database. Thus, by inserting their identities
into the Whois database when offering hidden Whois services,
domain name registrars could be judged as registrant for having
created the cybersquatting harm.
1. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.
The ACPA created a statutory tort that allows trademark
owners to sue only a "domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized licensee," 60 if such person "registers, traffics
in, or uses a domain name" in ways likely to create confusion and
61
with bad faith intent to profit from the mark.
As explained above, domain name registrars generally are
immune from liability under the ACPA. 62 "[A] registrar who simply accepts the registration of a domain name generally is not
liable for trademark infringement or dilution, unfair competition,
or violations of the ACPA." 63 Thus far, courts have not required
registrars to act as gatekeepers that prevent the registration of
trademark terms as domain names and have not found registrars
allowing such infringing registrations to constitute "bad faith
intent to profit" from marks. 64 However, no federal court has considered whether the sale of hidden Whois services can open a
registrar to liability under the ACPA, and no court to date has
applied the ACPA to instances in which the registrar appears as
a registrant in the Whois database.
Registrars that appear in the Whois database in fulfillment
of hidden Whois service obligations ought to be treated as registrants for liability purposes under the ACPA. As explained in
Lockheed Martin Corp v Network Solutions, Inc, the registrars
are immune from liability when acting in their normal capacities
as registrars. 65 The problem is that registrars offering hidden
Whois services are acting well past their typical roles as registrars by standing in the place of registrants in the Whois data60 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(D).
61 15 USC § 1125(d).
62 See, for example, Lockheed Martin Corp v Network Solutions, Inc, 141 F Supp 2d

648 at 655 (finding that 15 USC § 1125(d) does not give a cause of action against domain
name registrars acting in their standard capacities).
63 American Girl, LLC v Nameview, Inc, 381 F Supp 2d 876, 881 (E D Wis 2005).
64 See id; Lockheed Martin, 141 F Supp 2d at 656.
65 Lockheed Martin, 141 F Supp 2d at 655.
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base. Additionally, registrars tacitly recognize that the hidden
Whois service is one that extends beyond standard registrar
function, as illustrated by registrars charging additional fees for
the service above the baseline charge for the standard bundle of
registration services. Registrars offering hidden Whois services
stand in the place of their registrant customers in the Whois database, obfuscating the true identities of domain name owners
for additional fees. The nature of this exceptional service justifies
precluding registrars that inject themselves into the Whois database from the general grant of registrar immunity.
2. Agency principles.
An agency argument could operate as a theory of liability to
find registrars that offer hidden Whois services and appear as
registrants in the Whois database liable for registrants' illegal
websites. Registrars offering hidden Whois services operate as
agents for registrants by virtue of the formers' appearance as
registrants in the Whois database. The registrants are undisclosed principals in this agency arrangement, as prospective
plaintiffs cannot know registrants' true identity and are only
able to make contact with the agent registrars. 66 By charging
extra for the hidden Whois service, the registrar is acting in a
capacity beyond that of standard registrar, standing in the stead
of the registrant for purposes of the Whois database. Accordingly,
under this agency theory, any liability growing out of that registration can fall upon the registrar, because the registrar can be
treated as the party causing cybersquatting harm by virtue of its
designation as domain name owner in the Whois database. Here,
liability that would ordinarily fall only upon the registrant by
virtue of an infringing domain name registration can also rest
with the registrar. By serving as the undisclosed principal's
agent, the registrar assumes the risk of liability created by the
website or its illegal domain name registration.
Conceding that the ACPA did not create new causes of action
against domain name registrars acting in their standard capacities, 67 a plaintiff seeking to recover against a domain name regis66 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(2)(b) (cited in note 4).
67 See Lockheed Martin, 141 F Supp 2d at 655. As explained elsewhere in this Comment, Congress and the courts have not required registrars to serve as gatekeepers when
acting in their normal capacities registering customers' domain names. The law provides
no cause of action against registrars registering domain names in their standard capacities; however, this Comment argues that registrars that insert themselves into the role of
registrant in the Whois database through hidden Whois services are acting beyond their
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trar could still assert that the registrar served as the agent for
the unknown registrant by appearing as the registrant in the
Whois database and that this action opens the door for registrar
liability. Essentially, the registrar would be made to stand in the
registrant's shoes because it acted as registrant in the Whois database in a capacity exceeding the standard role of a typical registrar.
The cause of action is the registrant's violation of the ACPA,
and the registrar could be found liable for that violation by virtue
of its relationship with the registrant. Registrars offering hidden
Whois services operate as agents to the undisclosed principals
who are the registrants of infringing domain names. Aggrieved
plaintiffs alleging infringement under the Lanham Act are third
parties to the arrangement, whose rights are alleged to have
been infringed under the ACPA. The proposed liability rule
would come into force only when the registrant would otherwise
be liable for infringement and the registrar has hidden that registrant's identity and contact information from the Whois database. Thus, registrars offering hidden Whois services for noninfringing domain names would not be liable because no underlying infringement would exist, while those registrars offering hidden Whois services for infringing domain names would be liable.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency explains:
An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by
the agent's tortious conduct. Unless an applicable statute
provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability
although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with
actual or apparent authority, or within the scope of em68
ployment.
Accordingly, once a court accepts that the registrar is serving as the registrant by virtue of the former's appearance in the
Whois database, the registrar will not be able to escape liability
under agency law principles, unless the registrar can find and
rely upon some constitution, statute, regulation, or ordinance to
69
exempt its actions from liability.
The Restatement section stands for the principle that an
agent is responsible for the torts he commits. The registrar's tortious conduct is the cybersquatting violation for which it would
standard capacities as registrars and ought to be subject to liability.
68 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 (cited in note 4).
69 Id.
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be responsible by virtue of appearing as the infringing domain
name's owner. The comments to the Restatement elaborate:
An agent whose conduct is tortious is subject to liability.
This is so whether or not the agent acted with actual authority, with apparent authority, or within the scope of
employment ... The justification for this basic rule is that
a person is responsible for the legal consequences of torts
committed by that person. A tort committed by an agent
constitutes a wrong to the tort's victim independently of
the capacity in which the agent committed the tort. The
injury suffered by the victim of a tort is the same regardless of whether the tortfeasor acted independently or happened to be acting as an agent or employee of another

person. 70
In short, the agent's conduct makes it liable for its tortious
actions, independent of its relationship to a principal. This further suggests that even if a registrar released the identities of
the true domain name registrants, thereby disclosing the identities of previously undisclosed principals in this agency scheme,
the registrar's liability to third party plaintiffs for its tortious
cybersquatting would not disappear. Once courts recognize registrars offering hidden Whois services as agents of registrant principals, this logic results in prospective plaintiffs being able to
hold registrars liable as defendants at the outset of litigation,
thus obviating the need for plaintiffs' to issue repeated demands
for registrant information prior to filing a complaint.
While United States federal law reflects examples of agency
exemptions from liability for distinguishable agents performing
distinguishable activities, no federal statutory exemption or
privilege could be found to successfully relieve registrars of their
liability in this context. 7 1 For certain actions, federal law specifically exempts domain name registrars from liability. For example, domain name registrars acting as such are not subject to liability for providing the Federal Trade Commission with information relevant to unfair or deceptive practices or assets subject
to recovery by the Commission. 72 Such registrar action is distinguishable from the registrar action contemplated in this Com70 Id at comment b.
71 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 (cited in note 4) (requiring such statutory
exemption in order for agency liability to be broken).
72 15 USC § 57b-2b (Supp 2006).
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ment, as the former action is taken to assist in law enforcement
efforts and government investigations, while the latter obscures
private enforcement of federal trademark law. Further, the
United States Code contains laws exempting certain classes of
agents. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act exempts
agents of the United States government from individual liability
for torts committed while exercising due care in the execution of
a statute or regulation or while performing a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. 73 The specific principal-agent relationship exempted by this statute is distinguishable from the registrar-registrant agency relationship in which
registrars offering hidden Whois services engage. Because no
comparable statutory exemptions exist that could apply to such
registrars, agent liability for their tortious activity will not be
severed. 74 Furthermore, courts have applied the agency law principle that agents are individually liable for their own torts in
federal trademark, patent, copyright, and unfair competition
cases. 75
B.

Remedies

Under the existing trademark statutes, registrars' liability
could rise to the level of damages when offering hidden Whois
services. The remedies section of the Lanham Act explains that:
A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or
other domain name registration authority shall not be liable for damages under this section for the registration or
maintenance of a domain name for another absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registrationor
76
maintenance of the domain name.

73 28 USC § 2671-80 (2000).
74 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 (cited in note 4).
75 See Donsco, Inc v Casper Corp, 587 F 2d 602, 606 (3d Cir 1978) (liability to competitor under Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a), for acts of unfair competition; corporate
officer who authorized and approved acts of unfair competition is subject to individual
liability); Dixon v Atlantic Recording Corp, 1985 WL 3049 at *2 (S D NY 1985) (collecting
and licensing agent for owner and publisher of song 'Whole Lotta Love" subject to individual liability in copyright infringement action brought by copyright owner of song;
apart from "intricacies of agency law," a person "who promotes or induces an infringement can be held liable as a 'vicarious infringer,' even though he has no actual knowledge
that a copyright is being violated, if (1) he has the right and ability to control or supervise
the infringing activity, and (2) he has a direct financial interest in the exploitation of the
copyrighted materials").
76 15 USC § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, a domain name registrar's bad faith intent to
profit must be established for damages to be levied against it. 15
USC § 1125(d)(1)(B) sets out nine non-exclusive factors that may
be considered by courts in determining the requisite bad faith
intent to profit.7 7 Realizing that domain name registrars receive
extra fees for providing hidden Whois services and that such services inaccurately reflect registrants' information in the Whois
database, the following factor in the test for bad faith should be
applied to registrars:
[T]he person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of
the domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct. 78
Hidden Whois services fall squarely within the forms of
questionable action contemplated by this factor. Registrars are
intentionally providing ICANN and the Whois database with incorrect registrant information when they submit their own contact information in place of the registrants'. In doing so, registrars are creating extra profits, and, even though they are not
the registrant, such registrars are essentially trafficking in domain names that may be illegal.
In a case dealing with registrar liability, the Lockheed Martin court found that § 1114(2) does not create new causes of action but is merely intended to limit liability. 79 Because liability
already can lie in registrars through the agency principles explained above, a separate cause of action against registrars is not
required for them to be liable for damages when offering hidden
Whois services. Rather, the statutory cause of action that exists
against registrants in § 1125(d) can be used to find liability in
registrars, as registrars offering hidden Whois services would be
made to stand in the role of registrant. This liability is not limited to injunctive liability; it can rise to the level of damages due
to registrars' bad faith intent to profit from offering additional
80
and misleading hidden Whois services.

77 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B).

78 15 USC § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII) (emphasis added).
79 Lockheed Martin, 141 F Supp 2d at 655. Note that this case dealt with cybersquatting in the general context as opposed to a registrar providing hidden Whois services.
80 See 15 USC § 1114(2),
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While the Lanham Act's remedies provision may preempt a
registrar's exposure to damages, it likely will not exempt the registrar if a court finds that appearing as registrant in the Whois
database allows the registrar to be considered as registrant in
81
litigation under agency law principles.
C.

Benefits of a Registrar Liability Rule

Endorsing the proposed liability rule against domain name
registrars offering hidden Whois services would have numerous
salutary effects. If courts adopt such a rule, then registrars' costs
of offering hidden Whois services that shield registrants' identities would rise due to registrars' increased exposure to liability.
This would result in more expensive hidden Whois services,
which would reduce registrant demand for such services. Such a
decline in hidden Whois services would make the Whois database
a more accurate and useful tool for ascertaining true website
owners. This, in turn, would allow for cheaper and easier private
enforcement of anti-cybersquatting laws. Prospective plaintiffs
would be able to serve defendants with complaints on the first
attempt, relying confidently upon the information listed in the
Whois database. Under this rule, plaintiffs would not have to
take costly steps procuring registrants' actual information from
registrars who have hidden registrants' information from the
Whois database.
Further, registrars would respond to increased exposure to
liability by offering legally preferable services that do not obscure registrants' identities. For instance, registrar Network Solution, Inc.'s ("NSI") hidden Whois service operates in an acceptable manner that is distinct from those hidden Whois services
intended to be subject to the proposed registrar liability rule.
With its Private Domain Name Registration service, NSI enters
alternate contact information in the Whois database, but makes
public registrants' true identities and employs email masking
technologies to filter spam and automatically forward genuine
emails to registrants' private addresses.8 2 For each domain
name, NSI creates an alternate email address that appears publicly in the Whois database. Legitimate, non-spam email is for81 See Lockheed Martin, 141 F Supp 2d at 655 (finding that 15 USC § 1114(2) only
limits available remedies, but does not affect causes of action).
82 Private Domain Name Registration, < http://www.networksolutions.com/domainname-registrationprivate.jsp> (last visited May 15, 2008) (NSI's explanation of its private domain name service).
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warded to registrants' privately maintained email addresses. The
NSI service is distinguishable from the evasive hidden Whois
services contemplated in this Comment in two respects: 1) prospective plaintiffs can effectively and directly contact the domain
name registrants that use NSI's service; and 2) registrants' true
identities appear publicly in the Whois database. NSI does not
hide domain names' true owners. To the extent that registrants
purchase hidden Whois services in good faith to prevent spam,
we would expect to see registrars offer and registrants purchase
preferable services like NSI's.
The proposed liability rule would create additional efficiencies in instances in which a prospective plaintiff believes it has
causes of action against multiple infringing domain name registrations. For instance, if a single registrar registers multiple domain names that are confusingly similar to a plaintiff's mark to
multiple typosquatting registrants that use the registrar's hidden Whois service, then, under the proposed liability rule, the
plaintiff would only have to file one suit against the registrar in
order to protect its mark. This would be far less costly than pursuing several unknown registrants, whose identities are hidden,
in separate actions. Additionally, by allowing the aggregation of
causes of action into a single complaint against a registrar, registrars that are notorious for registering illegal domain names will
be held accountable for their role in facilitating illegal domain
name registration.
Rather than bringing suit against an unknown number of
unidentifiable defendants, plaintiffs should be able to bring a
single suit against a domain name registrar for all of the allegedly infringing domain names that it has registered that employ
the registrar's hidden Whois service. Agency law principles could
be used to extend registrant liability to registrars. That liability
would not disappear even if registrars disclose the websites' actual registrants. While this position reflects a definite movement
away from the complete immunity from liability enjoyed by NSI
when it was the only authorized registrar, the proposed liability
rule would serve as a check on today's competing registrars from
offering services that make illegal activity harder to prevent.
Another nuanced benefit of the proposed liability rule is that
it stands as middle ground that accommodates privacy interests.
To the extent that that domain name owners are concerned with
exposing their identities for sincere privacy reasons, the proposed rule is advantageous because it stops far short of outlawing hidden Whois services altogether. Rather, it merely sets a
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starting point from which domain name owners and registrars
could negotiate for hidden Whois services that do not impose externalities on third party trademark owners. For instance, a domain owner that is unwilling to expose its identity to the Whois
database when registering a domain name could include an indemnity term with its registrar in their registration contract.
The indemnity would contemplate the hidden registrant reimbursing the registrar for any tort damages the registrar incurs by
virtue of the latter's appearance in the Whois database. In this
manner all interests would be served: the registrant's privacy
would be maintained, the registrar would be able to earn a fee
for service and its liability would be recompensed, and any aggrieved trademark owner would be able to effectively and efficiently ascertain the tortious actor from the Whois database.
This solution is superior to the present condition, in which hidden Whois is tolerated unchecked, as tort victims will receive
clear paths to efficient recovery.
III. CONCLUSION

This Comment addresses the difficulties hidden Whois services pose to enforcing anti-cybersquatting laws. By using hidden
Whois services, domain name registrants are able to evade accountability for their ownership of infringing domain names.
Registrars that presently offer hidden Whois services do so in a
drastically different technological landscape from the one that
existed a decade ago. Whereas the hidden Whois service of years
past offered a legitimate service to registrants, today's hidden
Whois stifles private enforcement of trademark laws. This Comment sets out an approach that can be used by potential plaintiffs to enforce liability against domain name registrars for the
tortious actions of the registrants they protect. By posing as registrants in the Whois database, registrars are acting beyond
their standard roles and ought to be made available to liability
when their actions obscure a plaintiff's attempts to enforce his
rights. By creating a default liability rule for registrars offering
hidden Whois services, the framework proposed in this Comment
serves as an efficient middle ground between continuing to allow
registrars to undermine the integrity of the Whois database on
the one hand and completely banning hidden Whois services altogether on the other. Whether prospective courts read the proposed approach into existing trademark law by interpretation or
Congress amends existing law to explicitly reflect the proposed
approach, adopting the liability rule discussed in this Comment
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would help trademark owners enforce their rights and would be
a step in the direction of promoting lawful electronic commerce.

